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AbstrAct: this study investigated the relationship between conspiracist beliefs, 
reality testing, belief in the paranormal, and related anomalistic beliefs (urban 
legends). Attitudes toward general conspiracist beliefs and endorsement of 
specific conspiracy theories correlated with reality testing deficits and belief in 
the paranormal. High reality testing deficit scores were associated with less critical 
ratings of conspiracy theories and increased belief in the paranormal. regression 
analysis indicated that reality testing and belief in the paranormal predicted attitudes 
toward general conspiracist beliefs. Partial correlation revealed that reality testing 
and belief in the paranormal explained similar amounts of variance; both measures 
were similarly associated with attitudes toward general conspiracist beliefs. 
conspiracist beliefs positively correlated with related anomalistic beliefs (urban 
legends). correlations were found between attitudes toward general conspiracist 
beliefs, conspiracy theory endorsement, and individual conspiracy theory ratings; 
general attitudes were associated with specific theory endorsement, and belief 
in one conspiracy theory was associated with belief in others. these findings are 
discussed in the context of recent research.
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There is no single definition of the term “conspiracy theory.” The 
idiom has been used in several contexts and generally refers to a minority 
theory (Moscovici, 1987), or alternative (reasoned) explanation (Vankin 
& Whalen, 1999; Hofstadter, 1965). Conspiracy theories frequently proffer 
evidence (scientific research) that questions conventional wisdom (Soukup, 
2008). Critical authors, however, simply depict conspiracy theories as fallacies 
(Miller, 2002), or distorted, simplified views of the social and political 
world (Zonis & Joseph, 1994). More specifically, conspiracies have been 
described as pejorative fringe theories (lay beliefs) that are attributed to 
the concealment of an event (current or historical) from public knowledge 
(Barkun, 2003; Zonis & Joseph, 1994).
 Conspiracy theories are frequently endorsed when there is no de-
finitive explanation for an event, or the official account is considered to 
be deficient (Aaronovitch, 2009). Indeed, Knight (2006) contends that 
conspiracy theories arise from the need to understand the causation and 
consequences of significant events. This notion is supported by Goertzel, 
(1994), who believes that conspiracy theories form part of a monological 
belief system that enables individuals to comprehend new or threatening 
phenomena. This explains why significant events are frequently accompa-
nied by elaborate explanations (Bethell, 1975). 
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For example, conspiracists suggest that the assassination of Presi-
dent John Fitzgerald Kennedy (November, 1963) was orchestrated by 
several perpetrators rather than a lone assassin (McCauley & Jacques, 
1979; Summers, 1998). Similarly, conspiracy theories are often linked with 
powerful individuals or groups in positions of authority (e.g., governments) 
and involve intricate plots/cover-ups (e.g., the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the 
World Trade Centre; Moscovici, 1987). In this context, conspiracy theories 
can be viewed as rhetorical mechanisms that appeal to the general public’s 
emotions (Goertzel, 2010). 
Conspiracist beliefs cover a breadth of topics (e.g., mind control, 
faked moon landings; Vankin & Whalen, 1999; Ramsay, 2006) and are 
generally attractive and appealing (Byford & Billig, 2001; Swami, Chamorro-
Premuzic, & Furnham, 2009). Their availability and accessibility have in-
creased with developments in the mass media (e.g., internet sites/books/
podcasts). For example, “Loose Change” (http://www.loosechange911.
com/), an internet site concerning the 9/11 attacks, has been reported to 
be one of the most viewed movies on the internet (Curiel, 2006).  
The popularity of conspiracy theories has been demonstrated by 
several reports. Notably, surveys have established that more than a quarter 
of respondents believe the U.S. government knew in advance (Zogby inter-
national, 2004), participated in, or took no action to stop the 9/11 attacks 
(Hargrove & Stemple III, 2006). Such beliefs are not restricted to the West 
(Swami & Coles, 2010). Comparable results have been found in several 
Muslim countries, where 4/5ths of respondents did not believe the 9/11 
attacks were carried out by Arabs (Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2004). 
Recent studies indicate that conspiracy theories are continuing to 
flourish and belief in them remains robust despite strong evidence against 
the facts underlying them (Aaronovitch, 2009; Ramsay, 2006). In addition, 
consistency has been demonstrated across conspiracist beliefs; stronger 
belief in conspiracy theories (7/7 attacks in London) was predicted by 
stronger belief in other conspiracy theories (Swami et al., 2011).
 Examination of conspiracist ideation suggests considerable 
commonality with paranormal beliefs (cf. Irwin’s, 2009, definition of 
paranormality). Particularly, conspiracy theories are generated within the 
nonscientific community, they are rarely subjected to scientific scrutiny, and 
they are frequently endorsed by people who might normally be expected by 
their society to be capable of rational thought. In addition to this, conspiracy 
theories are an attractive stimulus material in the context of the present 
paper because they test official explanations for important/historical events, 
are frequently plausible, and the veracity of conspiracy theories is dubious. 
The important point here is not that official explanations are wholly 
satisfactory, but that they are based on prevailing interpretations of current 
evidence. Thus, they reflect the official, generally held account. In contrast, 
conspiracy theories are based on alternative readings of evidence that are 
less established, or less commonly accepted. 
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 Reality testing refers to the inclination to test critically the logical 
plausibility of beliefs (Irwin, 2003a, 2004). This definition is based on the 
work of Langdon and Coltheart (2000), who postulated that delusions 
and pathological beliefs arise in part from the failure to subject individual 
explanations of sensory experience to critical evaluation. 
Nonpathological belief generation occurs when the veracity of 
self-generated hypotheses (causal attributions) are critically assessed. 
According to this approach, paranormal beliefs are associated with an 
over-reliance upon intuitive-experiential processing and the absence of 
analytical-rational processing (reality testing; Irwin, 2009). Such beliefs are 
maintained over time because individuals fail to test rigorously their self-
generated interpretations of anomalous events (Goode, 2000; Irwin, 2004; 
Zusne & Jones, 1982).
 Irwin (2003a, 2004) found that reality-testing deficits play an im-
portant role in the formation and maintenance of paranormal beliefs. 
Extending this finding further, it could be hypothesized that reality testing 
will play a similarly important role with regard to the development of 
related anomalous beliefs. There is, however, a potential caveat. Particularly, 
it could be argued that intuitive-experiential processing is more likely to 
occur when individuals are not motivated to think deeply about a topic or 
process information in a rapid, automatic, subconscious fashion (Denes-
Raj & Epstein, 1994; Epstein, 1994; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 
1996; Pacini & Epstein, 1999). Conspiracists often devote considerable 
time and effort to the consideration of their favourite conspiracies and 
process them centrally in an analytical, rational style (Epstein, 1994). In 
this context, it may be that individuals use a central/cognitive/rational 
mode of processing without the application of effective reality testing. This 
noted, individuals may have a consistent preference for one reasoning 
style. Particularly, paranormal and pseudoscientific beliefs have been found 
to be associated with a tendency to favour the intuitive experiential style 
(Lindeman, 1998). 
 In this context, contrary evidence is ignored and paranormal 
beliefs are perceived as reassuring (Singer & Benassi, 1981; Wiseman & 
Smith, 2002). The current research investigated whether endorsement of 
conspiracy theories could similarly be explained by reality testing deficits. 
Particularly, the authors examined Swami et al.’s (2009) contention that 
adoption of conspiracist beliefs arises in part from the inability of individuals 
to exercise critical judgment (Bale, 2007). On this basis it was anticipated 
that reality-testing deficits would predict belief in conspiracy theories. 
Additionally, the authors expected to find that endorsement of 
conspiracy theories would be positively correlated with belief in the para-
normal because the theories share key common features. Ramsay (2006) 
reported a link between an interest in conspiracy theories and paranormal-
ity (the paranormal, the occult, and strange phenomena). Ramsay (2006) 
postulates that individuals who believe in unorthodox explanations in one 
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context (paranormal) are likely to endorse them in other contexts (e.g., 
conspiracy theories). On this basis it was anticipated that respondents’ 
ratings of conspiracy theories would be related to other anomalous beliefs, 
specifically, urban legends. (Dagnall et al., 2010d). 
 It was also hypothesised that conspiracy theory endorsement rates 
would be positively correlated; belief in one conspiracy would indicate belief 
in others (Swami et al., 2011). This prediction is consistent with Goertzel’s 
(1994) assertion that conspiracy theories form part of a monological belief 
system; evidence for one conspiratorial belief provides evidence for others. 
Finally, it was hypothesised that general conspiracist beliefs would be related 
to endorsement of specific conspiracy theories. 
Method
Participants
 One hundred thirty-six respondents participated in this study. 
There were 48 males with a mean age of 33.04 years (SD = 17.39), range of 
16–78 years; and 88 females with a mean age of 29.24 years (SD = 12.23), 
range of 16–67 years. Overall mean age was 30.58 years (SD = 14.32), range 
of 16–78 years.
 The sample was composed of undergraduates and employees from 
the Manchester Metropolitan University (MMU) and volunteers from the 
wider community; 54% were students and 46% were nonstudents. The 
proportion of students versus nonstudents for males was 42% for students 
and 58% for nonstudents; for females it was 60% for students and 40% for 
nonstudents.
 Respondents were recruited from several sources: local colleges, 
undergraduate and postgraduate classes, community colleges, local clubs 
(e.g., badminton, Taekwon-do classes), and contacts at local amenities (e.g., 
local hospital, shopping centres). Participation was voluntary, and respond-
ents could terminate their participation at any time during the study.
 The current research used self-report measures, which have a num-
ber of advantages: They enable a large and diverse pool of respondents to 
be recruited, enhance disclosure, and allow respondents to complete the 
measures in a comfortable and controlled environment at their own pace. 
This approach has been successfully utilized in the past to test anomalistic 
beliefs (Dagnall, Munley, Parker, & Drinkwater, 2010b; Dagnall, Munley, 
Parker, & Drinkwater, 2010c; Dagnall, Parker, Munley, & Drinkwater, 
2010a).
Measures
 Participants were asked to complete a booklet containing the 
following: a conspiracy theory questionnaire, paranormal belief measures 
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(Lange, Irwin, & Houran, 2000; Thalbourne & Delin, 1993; Tobacyk, 1988; 
Tobacyk, 2004; Tobacyk & Milford, 1983), the Urban Legends Scale (Dagnall 
et al., 2010d; Fox Tree & Weldon, 2007), and the Reality Testing subscale of 
the Inventory of Personality Organization (IPO-RT; Lenzenweger, Clarkin, 
Kernberg, & Foelsch, 2001). Questionnaire order was counterbalanced to 
control for order effects.
 conspiracy theories. Belief in conspiracy theories (CT) was mea-
sured in two ways: general belief and attitudes toward significant historical 
events. The historical events were selected on the basis of their inclusion 
within several conspiracy theory sources: 70 Greatest Conspiracy Theories of All 
Time (Vankin & Whalen, 1999), the wikipedia/online database of conspiracy 
theories (http://www.conspiracytheories.com), and “The World’s Greatest 
Conspiracy Theories” from a television programme highlighting the top 10 
conspiracies (derived from a survey of conspiracy theory websites). 
Ten of the top 15 conspiracy theories were randomly selected: 
John F. Kennedy assassination, Apollo 11 moon landings, the death of 
Elvis Presley, Roswell, the death of Diana the Princess of Wales, the suicide 
of Marilyn Monroe, the New World Order (a secretive power elite with a 
globalist agenda that conspires to rule the world through a dictatorial world 
government), the death of Adolf Hitler, global warming, and the terrorist 
attacks on the World Trade Centre (WTC).
 For each historical event, the official explanation was presented 
together with a statement indicating that alternative explanations/theories 
exist. Each event was followed by two questions. The first asked respondents 
to indicate the degree to which they believed the official explanation to 
be true; this was measured on a 7-point Likert scale (1 was “definitely not 
true” and 7 was “definitely true”). The second question asked respondents 
to indicate the extent to which they believed alternative explanations to 
be more truthful; this was also measured on a 7-point Likert scale (1 was 
“strongly agree” and 7 was “strongly disagree”).
 General belief in the veracity of conspiracy theories was assessed via 
five questions. These assessed the degree to which respondents believe that 
conspiracy theories accurately depict real-life events and contain truthful 
information. Responses were measured on a 7-point Likert scale (1 indicated 
“strongly disagree” and 7 “strongly agree”).  Low scores on these two scales 
(Belief in official explanations vs. Belief in alternative explanations) would 
suggest support for conspiracists belief, while a high score on these scales 
would indicate endorsement of established more official accounts. Two of 
the five items were reversed to control for response bias. 
 Paranormal belief measures.  Belief in the paranormal was assessed 
by the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (R-PBS; Lange et al., 2000; Tobacyk, 
1988, 2004) and the Australian Sheep-Goat Scale (ASGS; Thalbourne & 
Delin, 1993). The R-PBS is a modified form of the Paranormal Belief Scale 
developed by Tobacyk and Milford (1983). It is the most commonly used 
self-report measure of paranormal belief (Irwin, 2004). 
62 The Journal of Parapsychology
The R-PBS contains 26 items assessing seven factors of paranormal 
belief: traditional religious belief, psi, witchcraft, superstition, spiritualism, 
extraordinary life forms, and precognition. Items are presented as statements 
(e.g., “Black magic really exists”) and participants respond on a Likert scale 
ranging from: 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”); higher scores 
reflect greater paranormal belief. All items with the exception of item 23 
(“Mind reading is not possible”) are positively scored. 
The R-PBS measures overall paranormal belief via summated item 
totals. Alternatively, scores for each factor can be calculated. Recent work 
correcting for differential item functioning (gender and age bias) has 
identified a two-factor solution: New Age Philosophy (NAP) and Traditional 
Paranormal Belief (TPB; Lange et al., 2000). NAP (11 items) assesses belief 
in psi, reincarnation, altered states, and astrology, while TPB (5 items) 
evaluates belief in concepts such as the devil and witchcraft (Irwin, 2004). 
 The two-factor solution can be purified to correct for item bias by 
Rasch scaling the subscale totals; this produces scores ranging from 6.85 
to 47.72 on NAP, and 11.16 to 43.24 on TPB (Andrich, 1988). Despite 
theoretical concerns over the factorial structure of paranormal belief, 
as measured by the R-PBS (Lawrence, 1995a, 1995b; Lawrence, Roe, & 
Williams, 1997; Tobacyk & Thomas, 1997), the measure has been found to 
be conceptually and psychometrically satisfactory. Notably, the R-PBS has 
demonstrated good test-retest reliability (Tobayck, 2004) and been shown 
to possess adequate validity (Thalbourne, 1995a, 1995b; Tobacyk, 2004). In 
line with Irwin (2004), we used the two-factor solution suggested by Lange 
et al. (2000). 
 In addition to the R-PBS, the ASGS (Thalbourne & Delin, 1993) 
was employed as a measure of belief in psychic ability (Thalbourne, 1995a, 
1995b; Thalbourne, Dunbar, & Delin, 1995). The ASGS measures belief in, 
and alleged experience of, the paranormal by focusing on the subset of core 
beliefs studied by parapsychology (extrasensory perception, psychokinesis, 
and life after death (Wiseman & Watt, 2010). It contains 18 items and 
participants are asked to respond in one of three ways: “False” (scored as 
zero), “?” (“don’t know” scored as 1), and “True” (scored as 2). The ASGS 
has also been submitted to Rasch scaling (Lange & Thalbourne, 2002). The 
ASGS has established reliability and validity (Thalbourne, 1995a). 
 Urban legends. Belief in urban legends was assessed via five items 
interspersed within the R-PBS. Items were scored using the same 7-point 
Likert scale as the R-PBS. Two of the items were reverse-scored (e.g., “when 
I hear urban legends I feel that they are untrue”). These questions were 
derived from Dagnall et al. (2010d) and Fox, Tree, and Wheldon (2007).
 reality testing. Reality testing was assessed using the IPO-RT 
(Lenzenweger et al., 2001), a unidimensional self-report measure designed 
to measure “the capacity to differentiate self from non-self, intrapsychic 
from external stimuli, and to maintain empathy with ordinary social criteria 
of reality” (Kernberg, 1996, p. 120). It is consistent with Langdon and 
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Coltheart’s (2000) account of belief generation, placing an emphasis upon 
information-processing style rather than psychotic symptomology (e.g., “I 
have heard or seen things when there is no apparent reason for it”). 
The IPO-RT contains 20 items, with responses being recorded on 
a 5-point Likert scale (1 “never true” to 5 “always true”); scores range from 
20 to 100, with low scores indicating high reality-testing ability. The IPO-RT 
has demonstrated good psychometric integrity: it is internally consistent, 
temporally stable with nonclinical populations, and possesses construct 
validity and good retest reliability (r = .73; Lenzenweger et al., 2001).
Procedure
 Respondents were informed that the questionnaire/booklet was 
concerned with belief in paranormal phenomena. Respondents were also 
told that they must answer all questions and that there was no time limit for 
completing the questionnaire.
 
results
reliability and scale Descriptives
 The internal reliability of measures was assessed using Cronbach’s 
alpha (α). The R-PBS (α = .94), ASGS (α = .91) and IPO-RT (α = .92) 
demonstrated excellent internal reliability.  The two Rasch scale factors of 
paranormal belief (Lange et al., 2000), New Age Philosophy, NAP (α = .88) 
and Traditional Paranormal Belief, TPB (α = .83), possessed good internal 
reliability. The scales measuring belief in Urban Legends, UL (α = .75) and 
Conspiracy Theories, CT (α = .72), exhibited adequate internal reliability. 
Internal reliability prior to the removal of one of the Urban Legends 
(UL) items was (α = .67). Endorsement ratings for Official, OE (α = .79) 
and Alternative, AE (α = .79) explanations demonstrated adequate/good 
reliability. Descriptives for the survey measures are presented in Table 1.
conspiracy theory Descriptives and 
conspiracy theories Intercorrelations
 Mean endorsement rates for the OE and AE theories are presented 
in Table 2. Overall means for OE and AE were skewed above the midscale 
point, indicating respondents’ tendency to believe that OEs were true (M = 
4.71, SD = 1.05), while AEs were considered less true (M = 4.41, SD = 1.07). 
 For OE, scores ranged from Roswell (M = 4.20, SD = 1.57) to WTC 
(M = 5.33, SD = 1.92). For AE, scores ranged from Roswell (M = 4.14, SD = 
1.60 to Apollo 11 (M = 4.63, SD = 1.88). Overall ratings of OE and AE were 
found to be positively correlated, r(134) = . 47, p < .001); endorsement 
of OE was associated with denial of AE and vice versa. (Item wording was 
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manipulated to ensure belief consistency and to prevent response bias.) 
Next, correlations were conducted on OE and AE endorsement ratings. 
(When r is used as an indicator of effect size, coefficients above .10 represent 
a small effect size, .30 a medium effect size, and .50 a large effect size.)
Table 1
Summary Statistics for the Reality Testing (IPO-RT), Paranormal Belief (R-PBS and 
ASGS), Urban Legends (UL) and Conspiracy Theories (CT) Measures
	 	 	 				 			M		 	 		SD	 	 	α
	 	 	 	
	 R-PBS	 	 														51.48	 	 30.27	 	 .94
	 NAP	 	 21.38	 	 		5.25	 	 .88
	 TPB	 	 21.70	 	 		5.59	 	 .83
	 ASGS	 	 	 		9.32	 	 		7.68	 	 .91
	 UL	 	 	 		3.28	 	 		1.16	 	 .75
	 CT	 	 	 		3.76	 	 		0.94	 	 .72
	 OE	 	 		4.71	 	 		1.05	 	 .79
	 AE	 	 		4.40	 	 		1.07	 	 .79
	 IPO-RT	 	 	 40.24	 	 12.98	 	 .92
Table 2
Conspiracy Theories: Individual Descriptives
	 	 	 	 					Endorsement	Rate
	 	 							Official	Explanation	 	 Alternative	Explanation
	 	 									M	 	 					SD		 	 			M	 	 	SD
		JFK	 	 							4.33		 			1.54	 	 		4.37	 	 1.57
		Apollo	11	 							4.90		 			1.84	 	 		4.63	 	 1.88
		Elvis	 	 							5.19		 			1.63	 	 		4.49	 	 1.90
		Roswell	 							4.20		 			1.57	 	 		4.14	 	 1.60
		Diana	 	 							4.49		 			2.13	 	 		4.44	 	 2.05
		Monroe	 							4.61		 			1.73	 	 		4.24	 	 1.75
		Government	 							4.29		 			1.83	 	 		4.28	 	 1.79
		Hitler	 	 							4.87		 			1.64	 	 		4.44	 	 1.71
		Global	warming								4.90		 			1.77	 	 		4.54	 	 1.74
		WTC	 	 							5.33		 			1.92	 	 		4.41	 	 2.14
Consideration of the OE correlation matrix reveals positive cor-
relations within conspiracies (see Table 3). No correlation was found 
between Monroe and WTC. Similarly, positive correlations were found across 
AE (see Table 4). No significant correlations were found for the following: 
Hitler and JFK, Government and Elvis, Government and Monroe, Global 
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Warming and Government. Overall, the endorsement ratings indicate that 
participants responded consistently across conspiracy theories.
Table 3
Correlations: Reality Testing, Paranormal Belief, and Conspiracy Theories
         				1												2											3											4											5										6											7									8									9
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
1			R-PBS	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
2			NAP	 									.86**	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
3			TPB	 									.89**					.74**	 	 	 	 	 	 	
4			ASGS								.77**					.71**				.70**	 	 	 	 	 	
5			UL													.55**					.42**				.48**				.38**	 	 	 	 	
6			CT													.38**					.28**				.31**				.34**				.31**		 	 	
7			OE												-.33**			-.31**			-.30**		-.28**			-.17*				-.52**	 	 	
8			AE												-.25**			-.13							-.15*				-.19*					-.10	 	-.42**			.47**	 	
9			IPO-RT						.50**				.48**					.44**				.54**				.33**				.37**		-.15*			-.16*
*	p	<	.05;	**	p	<	.01	(all	probabilities	one-tailed)
Table 4
Correlations: Conspiracy Theories (Truthfulness of OE)
	 								1	 						2	 			3	 	4										5										6	 								7	 					8	 	9							10
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
JFK	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Apollo	11			.24**		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Elvis	 					.29**			.33**	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Roswell						.29**			.32**			.30**	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Diana	 					.23**			.39**			.25**			.38**	 	 	 	 	 	
Monroe	 					.34**			.19*					.28**			.32**			.38**	 	 	 	 	
Gov’t	 					.30**			.39**				.32**			.26**			.46**			.20*	 	 	 	
Hitler	 					.19*	 		.30**				.48**			.30**			.22**			.21**		.25**		 	
Global	
		warming			.27**			.28**			.24**			.19*					.17*						.16*				.27**			.22**	 	
WTC	 					.35**			.39**			.21**			.23**			.31**				.11						.30**			.21**		.25**
	
*	p	<	.05;	**	p	<	.01	(all	probabilities	one-tailed)	 	 	
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conspiracy theories, Paranormal belief, Urban Legends, 
and reality testing correlations
 The relationships between measures of conspiracy theory, 
paranormal belief, and reality testing were examined using correlations 
(see Table 5). 
Table 5
Correlations: Conspiracy Theories (Truthfulness of AE)
          1	 						2	 			3	 4										5									6									7	 			8	 9							10
JFK	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Apollo	11			.27**		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Elvis	 					.30**			.32**	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Roswell						.25**			.32**			.22**	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Diana	 					.21**			.34**			.21**			.37**	 	 	 	 	 	
Monroe	 					.22**			.29**			.31**			.20*				.40**	 	 	 	 	
Gov’t	 					.17*	 		.20**			.09							.19*				.39**			.01	 	 	 	
Hitler	 					.11	 		.24**			.39**			.24**		.30**			.39**			.29**	 	 	
Global
		warming			.19*	 		.41**			.44**			.38**			.20**			.30**			.11	 	.25**	 	
WTC	 					.42**			.38**			.42**			.24**			.25**			.25**			.25**		.25**			.17*
	
*	p	<	.05;	**	p	<	.01	(all	probabilities	one-tailed)	 	 	
 Significant positive correlations were found between measures of 
conspiracy theory endorsement (general attitudes to conspiracy theories, 
CT; OE and AE), measures of paranormal belief (R-PBS, ASGS, and UL), 
and reality testing (IPO-RT). No significant correlations were found for AE 
and NAP, and AE and UL.   
 CT was found to negatively correlate with OE, r(134) = -.52, p < 
.001; and AE, r(134) = -.42, p < .001. Higher beliefs in conspiracy theories 
were associated with lower endorsement of official explanations and higher 
belief in the truthfulness of alternative explanations.
 Attitudes toward conspiracy theories were found to positively cor-
relate with general paranormal belief; R-PBS, r(134) = .38 p < .001; and 
ASGS, r(134) = .34, p < .001. Similarly, OE and AE negatively correlated 
with general paranormal belief: OE and R-PBS, r(134) = -.33, p < .001; OE 
and ASGS, r(134) = -.28, n = 136, p < .001); AE and R-PBS, r(134) = -.25, p = 
.002; and AE and ASGS, r(134) = -.19, p = .016. Belief in the paranormal was 
associated with endorsement of conspiracist beliefs. 
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Looking at specific facets of paranormal belief, positive correlations 
were found between CT and the two dimensions of the R-PBS: NAP, r(134) 
= .28, p = .001; and TPB, r(134) = .31, p < .001. For OE and AE, negative 
correlations were found between OE and NAP, r(134) = -.31, p < .001; OE 
and TPB, r(134) = -.30,  p < .001; and AE and TPB, r(134) = -.15, n = 136, p = 
.038). No significant correlation was found between AE and NAP.
 Belief in UL was found to positively correlate with both measures 
of general paranormal belief: R-PBS, r(134) = .55, p < .001; ASGS, r(134) = 
.38, p < .001; and with measures of conspiracist beliefs: CT, r(134) = .31, p < 
.001; and OE, r(134) = -.17, p < .025. However, no significant correlation was 
found between belief in UL and AE, r(134) = -.10, p = .122.
 
regressions
 Multiple regression analyses were performed to determine the 
extent to which endorsement of conspiracist beliefs (CT) was predicted 
by paranormal belief (R-PBS and ASGS) and reality testing (IPO-RT). As 
a consequence of the differing content of the R-PBS and ASGS, a separate 
regression was performed on each (see Tables 6 and 7). 
Forward selection was used because it enters predicator variables 
one at a time in an order determined by strength of relationship between 
predictor and criterion. This enables the additive effects of subsequent 
variables to be identified. Prior to multiple regression, multicollinearity 
was assessed using the variance inflation factor (VIF; Mansfield & Helms, 
1982). The observed VIF values for IPO-RT–ASGS (1.417) and IPO-RT–R-
PBS (1.331) were within recommended tolerance; if VIF is larger than 5, 
then acute multicollinearity exists (Haan, 2002). 
Table 6
Factors Predicting Conspiracist Beliefs (R-PBS and IPO-RT)
	 	 										R2		 Β	 B	(SE)										β	 						t	 							p
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Step	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
										Constant	 	 										3.153									0.149	 	 		
										R-PBS	 							0.135								0.012									0.002	 		0.376	 		4.704	 		<	.001
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Step	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
										Constant	 	 											0.804								0.912	 	 	
										R-PBS	 							0.171									0.008								0.003	 		0.259	 		2.865	 		=	.005
										IPO-RT	 	 											1.603								0.615	 		0.236	 		2.607	 		=	.010
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 When R-PBS and IPO-RT were entered as predictors of CT it was 
found that R-PBS was a significant predictor, F(1, 134)  = 22.13, p < .001, 
explaining 14% of the variance. The partial correlation between R-PBS and 
CT, controlling for IPO-RT, was significant, r(133) = .24 p = .002.  Adding 
IPO-RT to the model yielded F(2, 133) = 14.94, p < .001, accounting for 
more variance. Explained variance increased to 17%; for the change, R2 = 
.04, F(1, 133) = 6.80, p = .01. The partial correlation between IPO-RT and 
CT, controlling for R-PBS, was found to be significant, r(131) = .22, p = .005. 
Both R-PBS and IPO-RT were significant predictors of CT.
Table 7
Factors Predicting Conspiracist Beliefs (ASGS and IPO-RT)
	 	 											R2	 Β	 B	(SE)												β	 								t	 								p
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Step	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
										Constant	 	 										-1.71	 0.869	 	 		
										IPO-RT	 								0.127								2.481	 0.547	 				0.365	 			4.536	 			<	.001
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Step	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
										Constant	 	 											0.76	 0.966	 	 	
										IPO-RT	 								0.148								1.749	 0.643	 				0.257	 			2.721	 			=	.007
										ASGS	 	 											0.024	 0.012	 				0.198	 			2.098	 			=	.038
 ASGS and IPO-RT were entered as predictors of CT. IPO-RT was 
a significant predictor, F(1, 134) = 20.51, p < .001, explaining 13% of the 
variance. The partial correlation between IPO-RT and CT, controlling for 
ASGS, was significant, r(133) = .23, p = .004.  The addition of ASGS to the 
model, F(2, 133) = 12.75, p < .001, accounted for more of the variance. 
Explained variance increased to 15%; for the change, R2 = .03, F(1, 133) = 
4.40, p = .038. The partial correlation between ASGS and CT, controlling 
for IPO-RT, was found to be significant,  r(133) = .18, p = .019. Both IPO-RT 
and ASGS were significant predictors of CT.
Discussion
 The present study found that endorsement of general conspiracist 
beliefs was predicted by reality testing and belief in the paranormal. In the 
context of specific theories, reality testing scores and belief in the para-
normal were associated with less critical ratings of conspiracy theories, 
lower truthfulness ratings for official explanations, and more positive eval-
uations of alternative explanations. In addition, conspiracist beliefs and 
urban legend ratings were found to be positively correlated. These findings 
support the work of Dagnall et al. (2010d) to the extent that reality testing 
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scores were fundamentally implicated in the formation and maintenance of 
anomalous beliefs such as urban legends. 
 As predicted, conspiracy theory endorsement rates were found 
to be positively correlated; belief in one conspiracy was associated with 
belief in others (Swami et al., 2011). In addition, endorsement of specific 
conspiracy theories was related to general belief in the veracity of conspira-
cist beliefs. These findings are consistent with Goertzel’s (1994) assertion 
that conspiracy theories form part of a monological belief system and that 
they explain novel events/phenomena that would otherwise threaten 
existing belief structures. Thus, belief in one conspiracy provides evidence 
for other general conspiratorial beliefs (Swami et al., 2009). For instance, 
the notion of a government cover-up in a specific circumstance (e.g., 
political assassination) generalises to other incidences (e.g., UFO activity, 
alien visitation, terrorist attacks) and suggests a general pattern of action 
(e.g., governments engage in deception; Goertzel, 1994). 
While reality testing scores were found to predict endorsement 
of conspiracist beliefs, the IPO-RT predicted only 13% of the variance. 
This suggests other cognitive-perceptual and personality factors also play 
an important role in the formation and maintenance of conspiracist 
beliefs. For example, Darwin et al. (2011) found that paranoid ideation 
and schizotypy were positively associated with conspiracy theories. In 
addition, Swami et al. (2009) found that 9/11 conspiracist beliefs were 
positively associated with belief in other conspiracy theories, exposure 
to 9/11 conspiracist ideas, political cynicism, defiance of authority, and 
agreeableness. Clearly, further research is required to identify the best 
predictors of conspiracist beliefs.
 Examination of the relationships between conspiracy theory 
endorsement and individual paranormal factors (NAP and TPB) and 
ratings of urban legend veracity revealed a similar pattern of correlations. 
Associations were observed between official explanations, general con-
spiracist beliefs, and the paranormal factors. However, endorsement of 
alternative explanations was found to correlate only with TPB; no significant 
relationships were reported for NAP or urban legends. This result can be 
explained in two ways: Either the relationship between endorsement of 
alternative explanations and facets of paranormal belief differs from the 
pattern observed for official explanations and general conspiracist beliefs, 
or the measure is less reliable.
 Consideration of these options reveals the latter proposition to 
be more logical. While individual conspiracy theory measures correlated, 
weaker relationships were observed between endorsement of alternative 
explanations and other measures. This may be because the phrasing of the 
item was less clear than for the other conspiracy theory measures. Particu-
larly, the wording suggests that other explanations may be more truthful 
than the official account. This is not necessarily the case: While respondents 
may have doubts about the veracity of the official explanation, they may 
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also not be convinced by alternatives. Believing that an official explanation 
is flawed does not guarantee the correctness of other solutions. 
This point was considered during the design phase of the study, 
when it was decided to avoid stating specific alternatives, because if respon-
dents did not believe the stated alternative was credible, they may reject it 
as untruthful even though they would endorse other nonofficial accounts. 
The general approach employed in the present study was used because 
the researchers intended to look at a range of conspiracy theories rather 
than one event in detail, such as 9/11 conspiracist beliefs (e.g., Swami 
et al., 2009). Clearly, future studies could extend the current research 
by presenting several of the most commonly cited/endorsed conspiracy 
theories alongside official explanations. 
Despite several important contributions (Goertzel, 1994; Swami et 
al., 2009; Darwin et al., 2011), there remains only limited understanding of 
the cognitive processes that produce conspiracist beliefs. One reason for 
this may be that conspiracist beliefs and conspiracy theories have typically 
been viewed pejoratively; they are poorly regarded and often associated with 
psychopathology (Darwin et al., 2011). This view is overly simplistic and 
ignores the critical processes associated with some “conspiracist beliefs.” 
The ability to question the authenticity of official explanations based upon 
selective evidence and or biased interpretations demonstrates a degree 
of effective analytical-rational processing (Epstein, 1994). In this context, 
individuals appear to use a central/cognitive/rational mode of processing 
without the effective application of reality testing. 
Problems arise not when official explanations are rejected but 
when alternatives are accepted without adequate evidence. For example, 
questioning the legitimacy of the official Roswell, 1947 account does not 
support the supposition that an alien vessel crash-landed. This is a clear 
example of a conjunctive fallacy, where the perceived inadequacy of the 
government account is wrongly considered to provide evidence for alien 
visitation (Nickell, 2009; Thomas, 1995). Logical fallacies (arguments from 
ignorance) may also be important: this is the presumption that a conspiracy 
theory is true because the official explanation is flawed (Copi & Cohen, 
1990; Walton, 1992).
 The failure to extend critical evaluation from mainstream to alter-
native explanations may in part explain the relationship between reality 
testing deficits and conspiracist beliefs. Particularly, conspiracy theories 
are adopted because individuals place an over-reliance upon intuitive-
experiential processing to the detriment of analytical-rational processing 
(reality testing; Irwin, 2009). In this context, the degree to which people 
endorse inadequate explanations/theories is a key factor in the formation 
of maladaptive beliefs. Problems arise when alternative theories are adopted 
without adequate evidence or critical evaluation. For this reason, it may 
be worthwhile to consider the relationship between conspiracy theories 
(endorsement and rejection) and probabilistic reasoning (i.e., perception 
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of randomness, use of base-rate information, the conjunction fallacy, and 
derivation of expected value).  
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PRUEBA DE LA REALIDAD, TEORÍAS 
DE CONSPIRACIÓN, Y CREENCIAS PARANORMALES
RESUMEN: Este estudio investigó la relación entre las creencias 
conspiracionistas, la prueba de la realidad, la creencia en lo paranormal 
y creencias anómalas semejantes (leyendas urbanas). Actitudes favorables 
hacia creencias generales conspiracionistas y el endoso de teorías de 
conspiración específicas correlacionaron con déficits en la prueba de 
realidad y creencia en lo paranormal. Déficits marcados en la prueba de 
realidad estuvieron asociados con menos evaluación crítica de las teorías de 
conspiración y con puntuaciones elevadas en la creencia de lo paranormal. 
Un análisis de regresión indicó que la prueba de la realidad y la creencia 
en lo paranormal predijeron las actitudes favorables hacia las creencias 
conspiracionistas en general. La correlación parcial reveló que la pruebas 
de la realidad y la creencia en lo paranormal explicaron una cantidad similar 
de la varianza; ambas medidas estuvieron asociadas de manera similar con 
las actitudes hacia las creencias conspiracionistas generales. Las creencias 
conspiracionista correlacionaron positivamente con las creencias anómalas 
semejantes (leyendas urbanas). Hubieron correlaciones entre las actitudes 
hacia las creencias generales conspiracionistas, el endoso a la teoría de la 
conspiración, y puntuaciones específicas sobre teorías de conspiración; las 
actitudes generales estuvieron asociadas con el endoso específico de teorías 
específicas, y la creencia en alguna teoría de la conspiración se asoció 
con la creencia en otras. Estos hallazgos se discuten en el contexto de la 
investigación reciente.
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TEST DE LA REALITE, THEORIES DE LA 
CONSPIRATION ET CROYANCES PARANORMALES
RESUME: Cette étude porte sur la relation entre les croyances 
conspirationnistes, le test de la réalité, la croyance au paranormal, et les 
croyances anomalistiques connexes (légendes urbaines). Les attitudes 
envers les croyances conspirationnistes générales et le soutien de théories 
conspirationnistes spécifiques se corrèlent avec des déficits dans le test de la 
réalité et la croyance au paranormal. Des scores de déficit élevé dans le test 
de la réalité étaient associés avec des évaluations moins critiques des théories 
conspirationnistes et une croyance accrue au paranormal. Une analyse de 
régression a indiqué que le test de réalité et la croyance au paranormal 
prédisaient les attitudes envers les croyances conspirationnistes générales. 
Une corrélation partielle a révélé que le test de la réalité et la croyance 
au paranormal expliquait des quantités similaires de la variance ; ces deux 
mesures étaient associées de façon similaire avec des attitudes envers les 
croyances conspirationnistes générales. Les croyances conspirationnistes 
se corrélaient positivement avec les croyances anomalistiques associées 
(légendes urbaines). Des corrélations furent trouvées entre les attitudes 
envers les croyances conspirationnistes générales, le soutien d’une 
théorie conspirationniste, et l’évaluation d’une théorie conspirationniste 
individuelle ; les attitudes générales étaient associées avec le soutien d’une 
théorie spécifique, et la croyance dans une théorie conspirationniste fut 
associée avec la croyance dans d’autres théories. Ces résultats sont discutés 
dans le contexte de la recherche récente.
German
REALITÄTSÜBERPÜFUNG, VERSCHWÖRUNGSTHEORIEN 
UND PARANORMALE EINSTELLUNGEN
Diese Studie untersuchte den Zusammenhang zwischen Verschwörung-
sneigungen, Realitätsüberprüfung, dem Glauben an das Paranormale 
und verwandten anomalistischen Beliefsystemen (modernen Legenden). 
Einstellungen in Bezug auf Verschwörungsneigungen und das 
Fürwahrhalten bestimmter Verschwörungstheorien korrelierten mit 
Defiziten der Realitätsüberprüfung und dem Glauben an das Paranormale. 
Hohes Abschneiden bei mangelhafter Realitätsüberprüfung ging einher 
mit einer verringerten Kritik an Verschwörungstheorien und einem 
erhöhten Glauben an das Paranormale. Eine Regressionsanalyse deutete 
darauf hin, dass Realitätsüberprüfung und Glaube an das Paranormale 
Einstellungen in Bezug auf allgemeine Verschwörungsneigungen 
vorhersagte. Eine partielle Korrelation ergab, dass Realitätsüberprüfung 
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und Glaube an das Paranormale ähnliche Varianzanteile erklärte; beide 
Werte zeigten Ähnlichkeiten mit Einstellungen in Bezug auf allgemeine 
Verschwörungsneigungen. Diese korrelierten positiv mit verwandten 
anomalistischen Beliefsystemen (modernen Legenden). Korrelationen 
wurden gefunden zwischen Einstellungen in Bezug auf allgemeine 
Verschwörungsneigungen, dem Fürwahrhalten von Verschwörungstheorien 
und der Einschätzung einzelner Verschwörungstheorien: Allgemeine 
Einstellungen traten zusammen mit dem Fürwahrhalten spezifischer 
Theorien auf, und der Glaube an eine bestimmte Verschwörungstheorie 
ging mit dem Glauben an andere einher. Diese Befunde wurden im Kontext 
neuerer Forschungen diskutiert.

